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Introduction
　 Eastern Congo experienced war between army groups and Congolese army in many decades that 
demonstrates the frailty of peace process in DRC.  The experience illustrates weaknesses of the 
Congolese army (FARDC), state authority and the difficulties of keeping a fragile peace with the 
collapse of various peace agreements. This essay attempts to identify challenges to peace in terms of 
security sector reform in DRC from the transition period until nowadays especially in Kivu provinces. 
The continuous fighting recalls the necessity for security sector reform (SSR) if state-building must be 
promoted.
　 UN plays a paramount role in promoting peace and international security since its inception in 
1945.  This international organisation participated in various peacekeeping operations through 
diplomatic, economic and military means and efforts to establish peace and stability across the world. 
Various authors think that UN is the leading international actor concerning peacekeeping. It combines 
the theoretical insight on durable peace and SSR with more practical insights on the fields.
　 Recently, UN peacekeeping operations started focusing on an aspect of peace and state building. 
This concerned the rebuilding of the security sector of conflict states as there was growing interest in 
the relationship between security, peace and development. The SSR refer to police force, juridical 
system, military, and other. ‘The SSR policies include activities like the reorganisation of different 
security institutions and organisations, the development of a system of checks and balances and the 
setting up of a stronger civilian and governmental control of the sector. The main thought behind 
these reforms is that a well-working security sector will provide stability in post-conflict areas and will 
lead to more prosperity and well-being’ according to Daniels Chantal (2009: 1).
　 DRC is one of the cases in which SSR program of UN’ peacekeeping mission is going on.  This 
country’s complex conflict involved active national and international actors. Despite the UN presence 
in DRC since 1999 till nowadays the conflict continues in the eastern part of the country. The conflict 
in DRC is a challenge faced by UN operations. The SSR was incorporated in by UN in its peacekeeping 
mission ‘mandate since 2004. Although many challenges exist, the SSR activities led down a 
foundation.
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　 However, much issues must be tackled.  Besides, the policies and activities developed by UN as 
well as the SSR seem not working to improve peace in the eastern part of DRC. Policies do not fit to 
the local context meanwhile the problems and challenges are recognized in the context of UN 
peacekeeping operations.
　 For this reason, it is imperative to understand how policies and activities are played out in local 
context of Kivu Provinces.  The exploration of SSR is important to understand the reason of the 
unending conflict and lack of peace in the eastern provinces.
　 This paper argues that the UN SSR was crucial to resolve the conflict unrest in the DRC.  However, 
there have been so much obstacles and challenges that impede the SSR implementation. 
Consequently, the SSR could not bring back durable peace in the Kivu Provinces.
　 This research has the following questions: i) Who are actors involved in SSR and their roles for 
durable peace in their various interventions? ii) Why the SSR policies and activities of MONUSCO do 
not contribute to durable peace in the Kivu area? Iii) Why there is a recurrent violence and instability 
despite MONUSCO’s presence in Kivu provinces?
　 The Methodology used is qualitative research.  These questions are explored in the context of 
MONUSCO’s SSR efforts in the Kivu provinces in the DRC. The use of qualitative method is based on 
secondary data including research and other official and unofficial studies, reports and articles from 
books, journals, newspapers and internet sources.
　 In this paper, the frame of analysis uses few important elements of UN SSR in Peacekeeping 
operation to investigate on the collected data in order to understand the challenges of SSR in the Kivu 
provinces.
I. UN SSR Role for Durable Peace through Peacekeeping Operations
　 For many years UN got involved in various activities.  This involvement aim is to achieve durable 
peace in conflict areas. Among those activities security sector reform is one of the most important 
parts. Some key concepts are connected and contributed to durable peace as well as UN Peacekeeping 
Operations.
　 The UN always work to optimise their peacekeeping operations in order to contribute to durable 
peace in more effective ways.  The role of UN peacekeeping operations in contributing to durable 
peace has often been acknowledged as important but has also been challenged. What about the 
relation between peacekeeping and SSR?
　 According to UN Security Council, SSR is “critical to the consolidation of peace and stability, 
promoting poverty reduction, rule of law and good governance, extending legitimate state authority, 
and preventing countries from relapsing into conflict” (Daniels Chantal, 2009: 47).  Besides, 
international organisations, governments and development practitioners accept OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) SSR definition as “transforming the security system, which includes all 
the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the 
system in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance 
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and thus contributing to a well-functioning security framework. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, 
the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing” ( 
Albrecht Schnabel at alii (eds ) 2005: 7; Chantal Daniels, 2009: 47) .
　 the UN currently looks upon SSR as a process that aims to improve the security of a state and its 
people.  It includes aspects such as the development of the justice system, and the (internal) 
governance of security sector institutions. Moreover, they embrace the vision that “a commitment to 
effective SSR is a part of comprehensive and sustainable peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Even 
though the UN recognises the importance of SSR, a common UN approach towards SSR is still absent. 
The organisation itself recognises its weakness and it is looking for a more suitable definition for the 
UN role in SSR. Nonetheless, even with an ambiguous definition the organisation continues to work 
on SSR in peacekeeping operations.
　 In 2007 the UN Security Council noted that a professional, accountable and effective security sector 
is of key importance for the consolidation of peace and security.  Although the UN is one of the most 
important actors in the field of SSR, it emphasizes that states are and should be the primary providers 
of security. “This is their sovereign right and responsibility” (p. 25). The UN, therefore, describes its 
own task in SSR as one of supporting national actors in maintaining and enhancing their capacity to 
meet their responsibilities.
　 For the UN, an approach towards security sector reform in post conflict situations is based on three 
clusters of objectives: (1) the construction of a new institutional framework, (2) dealing with armed 
groups and (3) the setup of accountable and durable security structures Daniels Chantal (2009, p. 53). 
As the UN update on SSR (2007) outlines “(i) the build-up of new security sector institutions, where 
none exist or are acceptable for reform by the International Community, or the retrenchment of 
overwhelmingly controlling, present, repressive and threatening state security institutions from 
intervention into politics, economy, and society, where such institutions continue to exist; (ii) the 
disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, transformation, and prosecution of illegitimate armed 
non-state actors in order to re-establish a state monopoly of legitimate violence; (iii) the long-term 
goals of building-up accountable, efficient and effective security forces” Daniels Chantal (Daniels 
Chantal, 2009: 53).
　 As the UN acknowledges the importance of making SSR policies context specific, their general 
notion of SSR policies and activities are taken as a starting point for SSR in the DRC but are not 
determinant or definite.  SSR is generally expected to contribute to durable peace. With this, MONUC 
or MONUSCO’s SSR efforts in the DRC are also expected to contribute to durable peace in the Kivu 
provinces. Therefore, this study will first analyse the role of UN mission’s SSR interventions hold by a 
wide range of actors involved or affected by SSR in the DRC.
II. Conflict Background Overview
　 The 1996 to 2003 Congolese wars caused severe humanitarian disasters.  Six African countries and 
some rebel armed groups played active role in the wars. About 4 million Congolese lost their lives; 
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others were displaced following economic and social infrastructure damage.
II.1. From local to regional conflict dynamics
　 A mixture of local, national and regional conflict dynamics constituted the roots of this crisis.  In 
1990s, “local competition for access to economic resources in eastern Congo was linked to a larger 
process of state collapse and to the regional dynamics of the conflict” (Hoebeke and others, 2008: 2). 
The recurrent violence has its basis on the persistence of many armed groups consisting a threat to 
both Congolese civilians and regional stability. DRC’s neighbors used these militia as proxies to attack 
each other and to control economic resources.
　 With the arrival of Rwandan Hutu refugees in 1994, “the Kivu provinces became a melting pot of 
national and foreign armed groups and military troops” (Daniels, 2009: 30).  In 1996, the AFDL, a 
Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan coalition led by Laurent Desire Kabila. One year later, the coalition 
broke up and the country became a battlefield for the armies of neighboring states.
　 Great Lakes region turned to a mix of local conflict with regional struggle for power dynamics. 
Consequently, President Mobutu was overthrown in May 1997 and Kabila became the new president 
of DRC.
　 The hope was the end of national and regional crisis.  But disagreement between Kabila and its 
allies resulted to an emergence of a rebel movement supported by Rwanda and Uganda against Kabila’
s regime. This brought about a war complex involving other African states.
　 These developments led to a worsening of local tensions in the east and an increasingly complex 
climate of conflict in the Kivu provinces and Ituri.  The integration of former militia into the army 
remained problematic. Certain Mai-Mai groups continued to resist disarmament and integration into 
the national army. The issue of Rwandan Hutu combatants within the FDLR had a negative impact on 
relations between Kinshasa and Kigali, and constituted a major security issue for civilians. The return 
of thousands of Congolese refugees who had fled to neighbouring countries was also problematic and 
threatened to reignite tensions between communities, especially in relation to land disputes. These 
various underlying issues were not resolved during the transition or after that period and continue to 
cause tensions and violence in the east.
　 In 2006, the mutinous Congolese Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda rejected the way in which the 
peace process was developing and launched a fresh rebellion known as the National Congress for the 
Defence of the People (Congrès national pour la défense du peuple, CNDP) in Masisi territory in North 
Kivu to defend the rights and interests of Congolese Tutsis, especially about the threat posed by the 
FDLR and the various hostile Mai-Mai armed groups (Hans Hoebeke at alii, 2008: 1).  From 2006 to 
2011, several other armed groups were strengthened in the two Kivu provinces. The Ihusi accords 
signed in March 2009 resulted in many integration into the national army. Despite this, however, at the 
beginning of 2012 more than a dozen armed groups remained in these regions (Alex Ntung, (2019: 
132).
　 Several violent clashes took place between the FARDC and the CNDP between 2006 and 2009.  The 
CNDP, with support from Kigali and superior troop morale compared with the national army, 
triumphed in almost every instance. The government twice attempted to integrate the CNDP – in 2007 
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(a move referred to as “mixage”) and in 2008 (resulting from the Goma Conference) – but both 
attempts failed. Each of these failures further aggravated the spiral of violence affecting those in the 
southern parts of North Kivu (JICA, 2017: 7).
　 At the beginning of April 2012, the peace agreement reached on 23rd March 2009 effectively 
collapsed, having long been put on the backburner as the national monitoring committee in charge of 
its application was no longer convened.  Following moves to isolate Bosco Ntaganda, the rebel leader 
defected, taking with him hundreds of former members of the CNDP. Clashes quickly resumed 
between the FARDC and this new armed group, which took the name of M23 (Movement of 23rd 
March (Mouvement du 23 mars) – in reference to the 23rd March accords) under the command of the 
ex-CNDP Colonel Sultani Makenga. Once again, the underlying problems were left unresolved and 
continue to have negative security consequences for the civilian population(JICA, 2017: 7).
　 For many years MONUSCO can’t bring under control the armed groups.  These armed groups kill 
civilian and threaten regional stability. The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) deployed under UN 
auspices in 2013 helped defeat the M23 rebel movement but still struggles to control the remaining 
armed groups. one of these groups is the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), based in North Kivu and 
kills civilian on daily basis(JICA, 2017: 7). ADF leaders have ties with Islamist Networks abroad but 
locally embedded. It often fights alongside local militias and exploit communal conflict to win support 
(Crisis Group Africa Briefing, 2019: 3).
　 Congolese president Felix Tshisekedi promotes a better relationship with the involved neighbors 
including Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda for a joint approach to tackle the armed groups.  However, his 
counterparts linked to those groups as proxies remain highly suspicious of one another but willing to 
engage in military and intelligence talks this year (2020). The risk is that some of the governments 
involved use these interactions as cover for increase military interference in the DRC. But there is 
chance of goal achievement for establishment of a new framework for regional cooperation (Crisis 
Group Africa Briefing, 2019: 2).
　 MONUSCO’s inability to stabilize the east frustrates the council members and opens a rethink on 
its approach to DRC.  Voices have been raised for its draw down gradually in the years ahead due to 
this inability. The mission became also complicated due to Ebola outbreak in eastern DRC (Crisis 
Group Africa Briefing, 2019: 3). Unlike Joseph Kabila his predecessor, president Tshisekedi not only 
keen to keep working with UN to suppress armed groups but also gain the support of UN council 
members for his regional diplomacy. From these dynamics, it is important to come back to the 2002 
peace accord.
II.2. Peace Accord and transitional government period
　  In this conflict complex situation, international community initiated peace talks between various 
belligerent parties.  This culminated to Lusaka Peace Accord, an Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the 
deployment of UN monitoring force as well as the signing of several regional and national agreements. 
This includes peace agreement between DRC, Rwanda and Uganda leading to the withdrawal of their 
troops from DRC.
　 The Inter-Congolese Dialogue held in Pretoria resulted to the signing of an all-inclusive Peace 
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Accord.  The 2002 peace accords made it possible to restore some unity to DRC and establish 
institutions of national unity which brought together the warring factions in a highly complex unity. 
During the transition period, combatants from the various rebellions were demobilized and 
reintegrated either into civilian life or the new FARDC.
　 In 2003, a transitional government was installed “to create a new legal and institutional framework, 
prepare general elections and reform the security sector” (Hoebeke and others, 2008: 3).  A committee 
called ‘Comite International d’appui a la transition’ (CIAT) was established to facilitate and manage the 
international assistance. The transition led to the first presidential, legislative and provincial elections 
in 2006 and institutions voted for by the people were put in place, the efforts towards peace and 
democratization appeared to be on the path to success. However, despite such significant steps, the 
peace accords and the transition left a whole series of key peacebuilding issues unresolved. This 
concerns also the SSR policies.
III. Security Sector Reform in DRC
III.1. Major players in SSR1
　 The transitional period was marked by a very weak security system due to the maintenance of 
parallel military capability by various former belligerents.  The presence of various national and 
foreign militia groups in eastern DRC complicated the politico-military situation and undermined the 
peace process.
　 Considering this presence as challenge for the elections, the international community made accent 
on SSR process implementation.  The main actors in SSR included Belgium, France, South Africa, the 
EU, Angola, MONUC and to a lesser degree the UK, the US and the Netherlands ( Hoebeke at alii, 
2008: 4). But, SSR support encountered problems in terms of coordination and coherence.
III.2. Tension between multilateral and bilateral approaches
　 After the October 2006 elections run off, the DRC government and international community 
relationships deteriorated particularly in policy domains concerning natural resources revenue 
management and SSR.  The World Bank prepared a ‘governance compact’ including SSR for DRC 
government. Despite SSR necessity, the DRC government considered it as an imported policy and 
then did not internalize it.
　 Consequently, tension emerged between multilateral and bilateral approach protagonists.  The 
latter was preferred by Congolese government and some donors. The multilateral approach was 
qualified to be slow and unclear in contrast to bilateral approach that seemed to move fast. It is clear 
that “lack of strategic planning both at international and national level seriously limited the impact of 
these initial activities focused on operational aspects of SSR” ( Hoebeke and others, 2008: 4). In the 
1　The United Nations supports security sector reform (SSR) to ensure the development of effective, efficient, affordable 
and accountable security institutions (UN web page: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/security.shtml
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government side, the focus was more on its sovereignty’s protection and bilateral partnership in order 
to comfort its independence of action.
　 The international aid system in DRC, which promotes a huge range of institutional reforms, in the 
case of the east, “stabilisation” – was in deep crisis.  Previously, despite major difficulties due to the 
political and security context of the transition period, the involvement of the international community 
enjoyed some success (the elections in 2006 and the creation of institutions under the third Republic). 
Progressively, however, DRC’s international partners have seen a reduction in their room for 
maneuver in influencing the policy agenda of the Congolese government.
　 The Congolese authorities requested the UN Organization Mission in DRC (Mission d’observation 
des Nations Unies en RDC, MONUC) to begin its withdrawal from the country, to assert national 
sovereignty.  A compromise ultimately led to MONUC’s mandate being redefined as one of 
“stabilisation” rather than peacekeeping. To reflect this, MONUC was renamed MONUSCO on 1st 
July 2010 and UN troops were further concentrated in the east of the country.
　 Finally, international partners were not informed prior to the 2009 rapprochement between 
Kinshasa and Kigali which included the decision to arrest Laurent Nkunda and launch joint military 
operations against the FDLR.  Although international mediators had played a major role in the process 
which led to the Goma Conference in January 2008, and international donors had funded both the 
Goma Conference and the Amani programme that followed, they were not informed of negotiations 
that took place between Kinshasa and Kigali (JICA, 2017: 7). The international community failed to 
find a space to express an opinion on the joint military operations and had to limit its action to 
supporting the rapprochement between the two states. As a result, the role of MONUSCO became 
limited to providing logistical support for the military operations of the FARDC against the FDLR.
III.3. DRC’s little interest on more structural components of SSR
　 DRC was skeptical to more structural components of SSR especially oversight, command and 
control mechanisms as advocated at multilateral level by EU.  The bilateral donors in charge of 
military were more active in providing training and equipment. The multilateral approach pushed on 
structural reform increased the Congolese government fear that lies on the possibility of losing 
control and sovereignty over its security forces. That is why it encouraged bilateral approach.
　 The post-electoral incidents of March 2007 in Kinshasa between the two presidential candidates’ 
camps: President Kabila loyalists and those of Jean Pierre Bemba showed the SSR challenges in DRC 
as well as the fragility of political process.  One can observe that SSR was not only a technical but also 
a political challenge. In addition, the incident illustrated the lack of capacity of the security actors 
namely the government ones who needed Angola’s military assistance. During the same year, a 
government major offensive failed against Laurent Nkunda’s rebel group in the eastern Congo.  This 
failure also demonstrated the weakness of security forces considered as main source of instability 
putting democratic process in jeopardy.
　 It was difficult for international partners to mobilize the commitment of the Congolese authorities 
to implement the various reforms that have been previously agreed.  The authorities have proved 
particularly reluctant to implement SSR and reform of the judiciary. These reforms embedded political 
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sensitivity, which explains why the government was resisting their implementation. In terms of SSR, 
which is essential for stability and therefore sustainable development, the government has consistently 
rejected all coordination efforts made by international donors, has delayed the implementation of 
much-needed legislation and has failed to develop a coherent strategic framework to steer such 
reforms.
IV. An Unsure Factor SSR and Recurrent Conflicts in Kivu Provinces
IV.1. DRC Army (FARDC) Reform
　 The Congolese army behavior constitutes a serious challenge for SSR process.  Various reports 
show that Congolese elements (FARDC) are among principal perpetrators of violence including sexual 
assaults against the civilian population in the Kivus (Hoebeke and others (2008: 5). Security conditions 
and legitimacy of the state are undermined by this abusive behavior. Local armed groups consolidated 
their power bases and control over natural resources. The FARDC applied the same dynamics. This 
situation is the direct consequence of the lack of command and control, adequate equipment and 
training, financial resources as well as political will for change particularly in the eastern Congo.
　 After elections, in 2007 the first government adopted the Governance Compact with emphasis on 
SSR.  According to Hoebeke and others (2008: 5) the document highlights priorities for the army 
(FARDC), but most of them have not yet been achieved. Some can be mentioned such as creation of 
integrated brigades and the dependents of military personnel, a locally anchored project for small 
arms and light weapons, the elaboration of key laws aimed at regulating the army, etc.
　 A failure to achieve coordination between DRC and the international community characterised the 
implementation of SSR.  After transitional period, stakeholders from the reform of FARDC, the PNC, 
and justice system met in February 2008 to formulate new arrangements for SSR. The setting up of 
three working groups aimed to achieve the objectives on DDR, rapid reaction force and on the 
situation in eastern Congo. Again, no consensus was reached on the relevance of some the key 
proposals. Once again, this underscores the coordination issue as a considerable challenge. But there 
was an agreement on the establishment of the Congolese army.
　 Improving and reforming governance of the Congolese security sector̶ including the army, police 
and justice system̶is crucial to reducing the burden of the military on the local economy in general 
and on mining areas.  Despite some external help for troops payment, the Congolese Government did 
not appear willing to downsize the armed forces due to lack of the high cost that couldn’t be met by 
the government, even with generous donor support. As a result, underpayment led soldiers to live off 
the local economy. International donors had an important role to play in professionalizing and 
reducing the size of the FARDC.
　 Unfortunately, training ef forts were fragmented, with dif ferent donors developing separate 
programs for only a limited number of battalions.  So far none of these support programs insist on 
downsizing battalions or removing them from the mines. The only international actor that could 
coordinate activities and set stringent conditions on overall support is MONUC, through the UN 
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Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (UNSSSS).  An alternative pathway for the international 
community to stimulate congolese armed forces’ size reduction was to make reintegration into society 
a more attractive option than army integration. There are some strategies used for this integration.
IV.2. STAREC and ISSSS as International and national stabilization strategies
　 Both the Congolese government and its international partners used the concept of stabilization 
since 2009 to produce a strategy addressing the various priorities to bring an end to the crisis.  The 
stabilization paradigm was used to implement a national stabilization and reconstruction plan, 
STAREC, for the areas affected by conflict namely the Kivu provinces. This plan led to an international 
plan known as ISSSS. STAREC succeeded the Amani Programme established after Goma Conference 
in January 2008 designed primarily to demobilize and integrate the various Congolese armed groups 
into the national army.
　 The vision put forward by the “stabilisation strategy” in the initial phase (2009–2012) was 
chronological and could be broken down into three phases: i) Clean up the areas where armed groups 
operate and maintain a military and/or police presence; ii) restore the state’s authority by renovating 
state buildings and deploying civil servants to those areas taken back from the armed groups; iii) 
Initiate socio-economic recovery and community rehabilitation projects.
　 The geographic dimension is an important aspect of the stabilisation plan.  it prioritised six 
geographic areas in the two Kivu provinces and Ituri. The intention was that the material benefits of 
peace in terms of security, administration and socio-economic factors in the targeted areas and to have 
a wider and indirect impact on neighbouring areas. During the first phase of the plan (2009–2012), 
efforts under STAREC and ISSSS initiatives were mainly oriented towards the restoration of state 
authority. The intended initiatives were not achieved but some gains were made in the socio-economic 
infrastructure sector. Beyond this significant but limited positive impact, the stabilisation plan failed to 
achieve its initial objectives.
　 The second more problematic hypothesis underpinning the stabilisation plan is that the restoration 
of state authority would necessarily have a positive impact on the well-being of the local population. 
This assumption failed to consider the patrimonial and predatory nature of the state institutions. 
Under the plan, the types of projects carried out in order to restore state authority were limited to the 
construction or renovation of public buildings and training for civil servants.
　 The ISSSS and STAREC proposition was part of the problem as purely technical solutions to 
problems were profoundly political in nature.  The low levels of investment in political dialogue during 
the first phase were due to lack of political will on the part of the government to reduce as much as 
possible the involvement of their international partners in internal political affairs. In more operational 
terms, other weaknesses and difficulties were identified. Individuals expressed their perception on the 
Congolese authorities as having no real desire to bring stability to the east of the country, either 
because it is not in their interests or because they do not feel it really concerns them. For example, 
the 490 magistrates supposed to run the peace tribunals were never deployed; the same for police 
officers in the new police stations. These Weaknesses favored the persistent violence in DRC’s eastern 
parts.
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IV.3. Recurrent conflict in the eastern Congo
　 In 2008, tension rose again in North Kivu despite the signing of Nairobi and Goma agreements. 
This demonstrated that belligerents had no will to implement those agreements. The evidence is on 
the fact that “repeated violations of the cease-fire by various belligerents ruled out the implementation 
of the following stages separation of the combatants, regroupment and demobilisation or reinsertion 
in the FARDC” ( Hoebeke and others (2008: 7).
　 FARDC operations showed structural rift in terms of logistics, basic training, command and control 
in 2008 during confrontation with Nkunda’s CNDP rebel forces.  It was also clear that Nkunda was 
supported by Rwandan government. This resulted to growing tensions at the regional level.
　 It is also reported that MONUC struggles to effectively address civilian protection.  Consequently, 
the mission is heavely criticized according to Reynaert (2010: 8). However, MONUC was in difficult 
situation in collaborating with a government army that lacked capacity with impossible joint planning 
at the command level.
　 It was a priority to restore peace in implementing the Goma Agreement and Amani process.  But 
the international community recognised that the general statu quo could not lead to a good outcome 
in a short term. MONUC must change its strategy in dealing with this complex situation with regards 
to SSR and political dialogue with different regional partners.
　 The meeting in Nairobi and Johannesburg organised by international community (UN, AU, SADC) 
resulted to a political framework known as 2007 Nairobi Agreement and the 2008 Goma Agreement to 
settle the crisis.
　 The control of mines and violence continuation are important factors of the crisis.  The control of 
mines by rebel groups is a key element in the financing of the violence that characterizes eastern 
DRC. Military attempts to neutralize rebel groups̶including the exiled Rwandan group Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Congolese group Congrès national pour la 
défense du peuple (CNDP)- did little to reduce their control of mines and may even have extended 
their grip (Hans Hoebeke at alii, 2008, Ruben de Koning, 2010).
　 The shift of the local power balance had impact in several areas of eastern DRC.  The FDLR and 
renegade Mai Mai armed group sparked retaliatory attacks on their former host communities and on 
the mining sites and trading points controlled by them previously (Ruben de Koning, 2010: 2) 
Similarly, human rights abuses committed by various FARDC units involved in military operations 
were reported. Although the access cut off to lucrative mines weakened the armed groups, natural 
resources continue to fuel conflict.
　 Persistent sexual violence as a war tactic is an important issue.  Widespread sexual and gender-
based violence (SGBV) in eastern DRC has received much international and national attention in 
recent years. the case of rape problem, victims access medical, legal and psycho-social services from 
several local NGOs are reported (JICA, 2017: 15).  Rape is often considered as a weapon or tactic of 
war used by the various belligerents to destroy communities socially and psychologically, and to put 
down all forms of local resistance. the scale of sexual violence committed against women and children 
is a serious problem in eastern DRC. The violence, massacres and sexual abuse has had a devastating 
effect on social cohesion. Consequently, the violence is particularly traumatizing for civilians with 
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parents been killed, many children left orphaned, child forced soldiers, and sexual abuse has torn 
many homes apart Alex Ntung, (2019: 132).
　 Nowadays, the recurrent conflict puts MONUSCO in Dilemma.  Diplomats and UN officials agree 
for a new approach in the DRC.  The peacekeepers dispatch to the country to help end its enormously 
bloody civil unrest occurred since 30 November 1999, MONUSCO with 16,500 soldiers and police 
officers, costing over $1 billion a year, struggles to end the civil war in the eastern provinces without 
easy exit strategy available (Crisis Group Africa Briefing, 2019: 3)
　 The presence of armed groups is both a source and symptom of regional instability.  The DRC’s 
neighbours have long used groups based on Congolese soil as proxies to threaten one another. There 
are apparent connections between one of these groups, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a 
Ugandan group and transnational jihadists based in North Kivu (Crisis Group Africa Briefing, 2019: 1). 
Regional intelligence and security sources, however, think the ADF’s connections to international 
jihad are disparate and incidental and that the armed group’s killings of civilians are motivated by local 
political factors in the DRC itself.
　 The UN has tried various strategies to manage these armed groups.  Congolese and UN officials 
have attempted to persuade some to merge their fighters into the ranks of the Congolese army, with 
limited success.  After one group backed by Rwanda, the M23, seized Goma in 2012, the Security 
Council mandated a stand-alone Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) – consisting of troops from South 
Africa, Tanzania and Malawi – to “neutralise” the militias (JICA, 2017: 7). This unit was initially 
successful, as the M23 collapsed as a major force in 2013, even if some of its veterans now appear to 
be active with other armed groups (Crisis Group Africa Briefing, 2019: 4).
　 The FIB has, however, struggled to deal with groups relying on asymmetric tactics, losing over 
twenty troops in clashes with the ADF since 2017.  The UN’s failure to tackle this problem is a source 
of public anger. Residents of Beni city set fire to MONUSCO offices recently in protests over the UN’s 
inability to prevent ADF attacks on civilians that claimed over hundreds lives since the start of a new 
army offensive in November 2019. The situation in the eastern DRC presents the Security Council 
with a knotty dilemma. Keeping MONUSCO is expensive and offers no clear path to resolving the 
problem of armed groups. But drawing the mission down rapidly could risk a further spike in the 
groups’ activities – potentially dragging in their regional patrons – that could both destabilize the 
eastern DRC further and undermine the legitimacy of the Kinshasa government in the country (Crisis 
Group Africa Briefing, 2019: 4).
IV.4. DDR and the Ongoing Conflict
　 Progress in SSR is important to build a trust relationship between the population and the 
government.  However, the failure to deal with the security threats in eastern Congo illustrated the 
lack of progress in the SSR process. Besides corruption, other major structural problems affecting the 
Congolese army are lack of operational capacity, discipline and cohesion. Some reports show the 
involvement of the FARDC in human rights violations such as rape, plunder, illegal detention and 
extra-judicial killings. The SSR supported by Belgium, the EU, and South Africa had a mere effect. 
The reason behind was “the lack of political commitment of the Congolese government to its 
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responsibilities” (Hoebeke and others, 2008: 8). Before the fight, MONUC trained brigades and 
created the initial rapid reaction brigades. This was considered as the only progress made with the 
army (FARDC). But, after the fight it was difficult to tell if anything remained.
　 The DDR of armed elements was a crucial precondition for SSR and a main factor of Goma 
Agreement.  DDR process was for both Nkunda’s forces and other armed groups. Since the Goma 
process, progresses were made in South Kivu contrary to North Kivu(JICA, 2017: 7). In addition, all 
non-state armed actors continued to recruit new combatants including child soldiers. It is important to 
note that “one of the troubles of the DDR programmes in the DRC is that they are taking place during 
an ongoing conflict, implying a constant possibility for demobilised combatants to return to fighting” ( 
Rouw and Willems,2010: 20).
　 DDR concerned both Congolese combatants and FDLR according to Nairobi Agreement.  But the 
Congolese government thought first to resolve Nkunda’s rebellion than FDLR issue. Then, Nkunda 
and the government distrusted each other and the Goma Agreement and Amani processes were 
unable to lead to positive outcome. During the confrontation with Nkunda in 2008, the government 
tried to push MONUC to adopt a more aggressive position towards Nkunda. As MONUC did not 
honour this request, it gave a negative perception of MONUC among population. Important note is 
that the Congolese army could not resist Nkunda’s forces without MONUC’s presence. This showed 
the Congolese army weakness.
　 The former combatants’ reintegration in a unified national army was one of the issue following the 
2003 peace accords.  Between 2004 and 2011, the National Commission for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (Commission nationale de désarmement, démobilisation et 
réinsertion, CONADER) (and later the PNDDR) was responsible for the DDR of some 120,000 former 
fighters (men, women and children) back into society across the country.
　 The main problem encountered in the reintegration process relates to the prevalence in the 
country of negative and morose socio-economic climate.  Although the reintegration kits provided 
essential assistance, but they couldn’t allow lasting reintegration.  Many civilians considered that the 
guilty parties are now being rewarded with reintegration kits. Their perceptions and readiness to 
accept returnees was critical to the success of reintegration efforts.
　 Similarly, the return and reintegration of refugees’ program was problematic.  The return of 
Congolese refugees living in camps in Rwanda to South and North Kivu was a cornerstone to finding a 
lasting resolution to the conflict in eastern DRC. It was one of the key points in the peace agreement 
between the CNDP and the Congolese government. The problem was an acute sensitivity as political 
identity; the return of these refugees was fiercely opposed by several armed groups and many “native” 
communities. This was both a social and a political problem that further worsened inter-community 
tensions and armed conflict in the east of the country.
V. SSR Implementation’s Hindrance in Kivu Provinces.
　 The goal of the UN in security sector reform was to support DRC and its people in developing 
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effective, inclusive and accountable security institutions.  Among them, the Congolese military 
FARDC to contribute to national peace and security, sustainable development and the enjoyment of 
human rights by all. However, the reality from the beginning till today shows a mixed result about its 
effectiveness due to the insecurity that continues in the eastern Congo despite the FARDC, police, 
MONUSCO and FIB presence. The SSR inclusiveness is not total as armed groups remain in the areas 
and continues to cause a persistent violence by killing and raping to undermined local resistance. The 
sustainable development cannot be promoted as the violence continues due to the hindrance of unrest 
and lack of durable peace. As MONUSCO, the government and the regional dynamics struggle to 
bring peace in the areas, it is difficult to talk about the enjoyments of human rights for Kivu provinces 
populations.
　 The SSR was undertaken by a national decision that led the security council to issue the mandate to 
support MONUSCO and peacekeeping operations for civilian protection in implementing structural 
components of SSR.  However, DRC was skeptical to more structural components of SSR and delayed 
their implementation and failed to develop a coherent strategy to control the reforms. The rejection of 
suggestions calls always for alternatives. But this DRC case, the government did not bring proposals 
to substitute the rejected ones.
　 The SSR did successful activities but many policies that were supposed to support the SSR in order 
to be successful and sustainable were not implemented because of some disagreement between the 
multilateral and bilateral approaches.  The multilateral approach qualified to be slow and unclear for 
the country stabilization. The Congolese government feared the reduction of its power on security 
institutions prefered the bilateral approach that seem to move fast consequently, it rejected all 
coordination efforts by international donors. However, this move did not help Congolese to gain a 
durable peace even though the state authority was established in most part of the country.
　 It is difficult to say that the UN approach to SSR in Kivu provinces was flexible and fit the local and 
regional dynamics as many policies do not favor the regain of durable peace.  Many of the 
stakeholders are unsatisfied of the way the local, national, regional and international actors handled 
the peace process that didn’t achieve it goals.  Local tensions are illustrated by the fight between the 
FARDC and armed groups, the control of economic resources attracted by the neighboring countries 
at regional level and the international community struggle to end violence.
　 A United Nations approach to security sector reform is said to be gender sensitive throughout its 
planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases.  However, reports and facts 
show that persistent sexual violence and rape is still going on in the eastern Congo even though some 
efforts have been done to psychologically and medically taken care of by the 2019 Nobel price Dr. 
Mukwege. This is not enough because the roots cause of this sexual violence has not yet identified. 
The perpetrators of these acts remain unknown and unpunished. This shows the weakness of the 
judicial system that is one of the parts of SSR.
　 The planning and implementation of post-conflict activities were essential for SSR framework. 
Considering the case of DDR that was attempted but failed as the reintegration of the combatants into 
the unified army or in civil life did not meet some preconditions. The government was also in 
disagreement with MONUC as it has no aggressive position towards Nkunda’s armed group to accept 
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DDR(JICA, 2017: 7). Another point is the socio-economic situation could not allow a lasting 
reintegration. Ideally, security sector reform should begin at the outset of a peace process and should 
be incorporated into early recovery and development strategies. In practice, SSR encountered various 
obstacles that hindered its implementation. Consequently, the durable peace is yet to come in the 
eastern provinces of DRC.
Conclusion
　  From the transitional period till the election of a new president, various security crises 
demonstrated the lack of structural progress in SSR of the army (FARDC).  This situation had 
consequence on the country stability and democratic consolidation. SSR had no impact on human 
security in DRC. This is illustrated by the lack of coordination and coherence between donors in the 
peace building efforts.
　 Peace building and SSR are important technical and political processes that help to establish 
security and democratic institutions.  But in the case of DRC, SSR had various challenges that needed 
to be overcome in order to guarantee a security system that could avoid resumption of war. The DRC 
case shows the government passivity in its adoption of policies and strategies for the successful SSR 
processes.
　 This lack of progress in SSR has effect in the country especially in the Kivu provinces with 
recurrent wars.  It provides a conducive environment for militia recruitment and natural resources 
control. It is better to address this insecurity by implementing SSR as conceptualised for the 
establishment of a security system that will be effective in order to avoid the resumption of wars in the 
country especially in east Congo.
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Abstract
　 The recurrent conflict and unrest are happening in Kivu provinces in the eastern part of The 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).  Despite the presence of the Congolese army, UN mission 
MONUSCO and a stand-alone Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), the population is still experiencing 
killings and displacements from these areas.  UN peacekeeping operations focus on the security sector 
used the UN SSR policies to reorganize different security institutions to provide stability in the country 
especially in Kivu provinces.  However, these SSR policies seem to fail in bringing peace in eastern 
Congo.  For this reason, the study attempts to explore problems and challenges encountered in SSR 
policies implementation that impede the resume of durable peace.  This qualitative research uses 
secondary data collected from books, journals, newspapers and internet sources.  Few important 
elements of UN SSR in peacekeeping are used as a framework to analyse the data.  Unless SSR 
challenges are well identified and led to an adequate implementation, there could not be hope of durable 
peace in the Kivu provinces in the eastern of the Democratic republic of Congo.
